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Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply 
to Yli-Vakkuri. 
SARAH SAWYER 
 
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2017) has recently argued that the Twin Earth thought 
experiments offered in favour of semantic externalism can be replaced by a 
straightforward deductive argument from premises widely accepted by both 
internalists and externalists alike. While acknowledging the role of thought 
experiments in philosophical theorizing, a deductive argument in favour of 
externalism from agreed principles would undoubtedly be preferable on the 
grounds that it would be less vulnerable to competing interpretations and 
hence would be more likely to settle the debate between internalists and 
externalists in a decisive manner. As an externalist, I would welcome such a 
proof. The deductive argument Yli-Vakkuri offers, however, depends on 
premises which are such that, on standard formulations of internalism, they 
cannot be satisfied by a single belief simultaneously; it does not therefore, 
constitute a proof of externalism. The aim of this paper is to explain why. 
Yli-Vakkuri takes semantic externalism to be ‘the thesis that the 
contents of intentional states (such as beliefs) and speech acts (such as 
assertions) are not determined by the way those subjects are internally’ (2017: 
1) and focuses for simplicity on the contents of beliefs. Externalism, thus 
restricted, is understood as the thesis that the content of a belief is not 
determined by the way the subject is internally. This is clarified by using the 
notions of duplicate, correspondence and narrowness. Things that are 
internally the same are duplicates; whenever S and S’ are duplicates, each 
part of S corresponds to a part of S’; and a property P of beliefs is narrow iff, 
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necessarily, any corresponding beliefs of duplicate subjects either both have 
P or both lack P (2017: 3).  
Internalism, understood as the claim that belief content is narrow, is 
then formalized as follows, where the variables range over beliefs, the two-
place predicate C expresses the relation of being corresponding beliefs of 
duplicate subjects, and the function symbols c and v express, respectively, 
content and truth-value (2017: 5):  
 
NARROWc: xy (C(x, y) → c(x) = c(y)) 
 
NARROWc says that, necessarily, any corresponding beliefs of duplicate 
subjects have the same content, i.e. that content is narrow. (2017: 5) 
The deductive argument in favour of externalism makes use of two 
additional premises. The first premise is formalized as: 
 
BROADT: xy (C(x, y) → v(x) = v(y))  
 
BROADT says that it is not necessary that all corresponding beliefs of 
duplicate subjects have the same truth value. (2017: 5) Truth, according to 
Yli-Vakkuri, is a ‘paradigmatic broad semantic property’ (2017: 4), a fact 
which he says ‘passes without comment’ (2017: 5). The second premise is 
formalized as: 
 
TRANSPARENCY: x v(x) = v(c(x))  
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TRANSPARENCY says that, necessarily, the truth value of a belief is the 
same as the truth value of its content. (2017: 5) Transparency is taken to be 
true on the grounds that if it were false, then one of the following would be 
true: either (i) S’s belief that p is true but it is not true that p; or (ii) S’s belief 
that p is not true, and p. Since, according to Yli-Vakkuri, neither (i) nor (ii) 
is possible, TRANSPARENCY is established. (2017: 5) 
 Yli-Vakkuri’s deductive argument is based on a derivation of the 
inconsistency of the set {TRANSPARENCY, BROADT, NARROWc} using 
only standard first-order logic plus K, the weakest normal modal logic. Since 
NARROWc expresses internalism and the negation of internalism is 
externalism, this amounts to a derivation of externalism from the conjunction 
of TRANSPARENCY and BROADT. I do not dispute the derivation. 
However, the claim that this amounts to a proof of externalism rests on Yli-
Vakkuri’s further claim that TRANSPARENCY and BROADT are accepted 
by internalists and externalists alike. I will argue, in contrast, that on standard 
formulations of internalism, a belief is a substitution instance of 
TRANSPARENCY iff it is not a substitution instance of BROADT. That is 
to say, corresponding beliefs which differ in truth-value are such that their 
truth-value is not necessarily identical to that of their content; and 
corresponding beliefs whose truth-value is necessarily identical to that of 
their content necessarily have the same truth-value. Specifically, beliefs fall 
into two distinct categories—indexical beliefs and non-indexical beliefs—
and indexical beliefs satisfy BROADT but not TRANSPARENCY, while 
non-indexical beliefs satisfy TRANSPARENCY but not BROADT. The 
deductive argument, then, rests on a failure to distinguish indexical from non-
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indexical beliefs and a corresponding ambiguity concerning the notion of a 
belief’s content. 
 Let us examine indexical beliefs first. Suppose S sincerely utters the 
sentence ‘That is an apple’, thereby expressing an indexical (demonstrative) 
belief. We are assuming internalism, and hence are committed to NARROWc. 
As such, we are committed to the claim that necessarily, any corresponding 
beliefs of duplicate subjects have the same content. Nonetheless, and in 
accordance with BROADT, corresponding indexical beliefs of duplicate 
subjects may well differ in truth-value: we need only suppose, for example, 
that S is pointing at an apple (making her belief true) while S’ is pointing at a 
pear (making her belief false). How are we to reconcile the claim that 
corresponding indexical beliefs of duplicate subjects necessarily have the 
same content while not necessarily having the same truth-value? Clearly the 
content of such beliefs cannot be ‘object-dependent’, since this would violate 
NARROWc.
1 Rather, the content of the beliefs of S and S’ must be understood 
as object-independent. And we find just such a view articulated by Burge 
(1977) and then defended by Segal (1989).  
According to Burge and Segal, a sentence containing an indexical 
term expresses a belief the content of which is akin to an open sentence rather 
than to a closed sentence. That is, the content of an indexical belief is 
specified as a predicative, propositional fragment rather than a complete 
proposition. An indexical belief understood in this way requires that its 
content be applied in a context in order for it to be truth-evaluable. This means 
the same content can be applied across a range of different contexts with 
                                                 
1 For object-dependent thought theories see Evans (1982) and McDowell (1977, 1984). 
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different resulting truth-values. The content of corresponding indexical 
beliefs of duplicate subjects can thus be understood as identical precisely 
because the duplicates can be understood as applying the same predicative, 
propositional fragment in different contexts.2 The difference in truth-value 
between corresponding indexical beliefs of duplicate subjects is explained by 
the difference in contextual application and is not due to a difference in their 
content. In the example above, the apple and the pear determine that the truth-
values of the corresponding beliefs of S and S’ differ, but the contents of the 
corresponding beliefs may nonetheless be identical—thought by S in the 
context of the apple, and thought by S’ in the context of the pear. The view 
involves a distinction between an indexical belief, which is truth-evaluable, 
and its content, which is not. An indexical belief is truth-evaluable because it 
involves a contextual application of a content which is in itself neither true 
nor false. It is this distinction between a belief and its content that entails the 
falsehood of TRANSPARENCY for indexical beliefs. We can now see that 
rejecting TRANSPARENCY does not imply, as Yli-Vakkuri maintains, 
either (i) S’s belief that p is true but it is not true that p, or (ii) S’s belief that 
p is not true, and p. Rather, (i) and (ii) fail to capture the correct logical form 
of indexical beliefs by representing the content of all beliefs as complete 
propositions. The content of an indexical belief is, in contrast, an incomplete 
                                                 
2 The view is consistent with the propositional fragment being either broad or narrow, 
which explains why it is consistent for the view to be held by both Burge, a paradigmatic 
externalist, and Segal, a paradigmatic internalist. See Sawyer (2011). The important point 
here is that the nature of indexical beliefs as akin to open sentences is consistent with 
NARROWc and BROADT but inconsistent with TRANSPARENCY.  
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propositional fragment that acquires a truth-value only in the context of 
application. 
Farkas (2008) and Pitt (2013) provide an alternative internalist 
account of indexical beliefs, but the implication for Yli-Vakkuri’s argument 
is the same. Given the internalist commitment to NARROWc, Farkas and Pitt 
also maintain that a difference in truth-value between corresponding 
indexical beliefs is due to a difference in contextual application rather than 
due to a difference in content.3 But there are two striking differences between 
their view and that of Burge and Segal. First, neither Farkas nor Pitt talk of 
the content of an indexical belief as a predicative, propositional fragment; 
and second, they do not draw a distinction between an indexical belief and its 
content. But there are corollaries of each of these claims in their account. In 
fact, it would not be implausible to think of the views as notational variants. 
With regard to the first difference, Pitt says that ‘indexical contents are thin’ 
(2013: 61, original emphasis), by which he means that they are not truth-
evaluable in their own right but only relative to a context of application. This, 
then, plays the same explanatory role as Burge and Segal’s claim that 
indexical contents are predicative, propositional fragments. With regard to 
the second difference, Farkas and Pitt agree with the fundamental claim that 
indexical content requires a contextual application in order to be truth-
                                                 
3 Both Farkas and Pitt take their view of indexical beliefs to be part of a wider, internalist 
understanding of context-dependent beliefs. Context-dependent but non-indexical beliefs 
include, on this view, descriptive beliefs, such as the belief that the President of the United 
States is a criminal (Pitt, 2013: 53), and general beliefs, such as the belief that all dogs are 
quadrupeds (Pitt, 2013: 53). For present purposes I restrict my discussion to their account 
of indexical beliefs. 
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evaluable. Whether an indexical belief is then understood as the indexical 
content itself or the truth-evaluable result of a contextual application of the 
indexical content seems to be a matter of terminological preference. Farkas 
and Pitt opt for the former; Burge and Segal opt for the latter. The important 
point for present purposes is that both views entail the falsehood of 
TRANSPARENCY. This is because both views reject the claim, implicit in 
the statement of TRANSPARENCY, that the content of a belief is a complete, 
truth-evaluable proposition. The content of an indexical belief is, on neither 
account, a complete, truth-evaluable proposition. 
Let us now examine non-indexical beliefs. Non-indexical beliefs are 
beliefs which have, as their content, complete propositions. For such beliefs, 
TRANSPARENCY is clearly true: the truth value of a non-indexical belief is 
the same as the truth value of its content. Rejecting TRANSPARENCY for 
non-indexical beliefs would, I agree, lead to the kinds of absurdities Yli-
Vakkuri mentions.4 Again, for the sake of the argument, we are assuming 
internalism and hence are committed to NARROWc. As such, we are 
committed to the claim that necessarily, any corresponding non-indexical 
beliefs of duplicate subjects have the same content. But given 
TRANSPARENCY, this means that necessarily, any corresponding non-
indexical beliefs of duplicate subjects have the same truth-value. This 
amounts to a rejection of BROADT. One might wonder how this is possible. 
                                                 
4 The specific examples Yli-Vakkuri offers to illustrate this point involve singular uses of 
names. Since I take names to be predicates with a demonstrative (and hence indexical) 
element in their singular use, I do not think the examples work on the grounds that they 
express indexical beliefs with contents which are incomplete propositional fragments. See 
Burge (1973). See also Sawyer (2010). Nonetheless, I agree with the claim. 
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Yli-Vakkuri reflects a common intuition when he says that truth is a 
paradigmatic broad semantic property and that it requires no further 
comment. But the intuition that truth is a broad semantic property is grounded 
in the idea that the truth or falsity of a belief depends on facts beyond the 
believer. This, I take it, is true. It does not follow from this, however, that 
corresponding beliefs of duplicate subjects might have different truth values. 
To see this, we need simply look at the internalist view defended by Segal 
(2000), which, I will argue, implies that corresponding non-indexical beliefs 
of duplicate subjects necessarily have the same truth-value. If this is right, 
then there is a standard internalist view of non-indexical beliefs according to 
which TRANSPARENCY is true and BROADT is false. 
Consider the example in Putnam (1975) of the duplicate subjects 
Oscar, on Earth, and Toscar, on Twin Earth. According to the externalist, 
Oscar refers to water (H2O) by his use of the term ‘water’, while Toscar refers 
to twin water (XYZ) by his use of the term ‘water’. As such, they express 
beliefs with different contents when they utter the same-sounding sentence 
‘water always contains oxygen’.5 The content of Oscar’s belief is water 
always contains oxygen, while the content of Toscar’s belief is twater always 
contains oxygen. And it is clear that Oscar’s belief is true while Toscar’s 
belief is false. This illustrates the truth of BROADT on the externalist 
understanding of the content of non-indexical beliefs. According to the 
internalist theory proposed by Segal, in contrast, Oscar and Toscar each 
                                                 
5 We are to assume that neither Oscar nor Toscar knows the compositional structure of the 
watery stuff in their environments, but we can suppose for the purposes of this example 
that they have learnt about oxygen and compositional structure through other examples, 
and have come to form the corresponding beliefs by means of conjecture. 
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express beliefs with the same content because their corresponding beliefs 
have the same (narrow) cognitive role. The term ‘water’ as used by Oscar and 
Toscar has an extension which includes water, twin water, and anything else 
that is (roughly speaking) indistinguishable from their point of view. Let us 
use the term ‘water*’ to refer to all such substances. This allows us to capture 
the content of the corresponding beliefs of Oscar and Toscar. The content of 
their beliefs is simply water* always contains oxygen. And now we can see 
why it is impossible for the truth-value of Oscar’s belief to differ from the 
truth-value of Toscar’s belief. The belief that water* always contains oxygen 
is false no matter who utters it, because water* does not always contain 
oxygen—twin water provides a counterexample. It is worth noting that there 
is a perfectly good sense in which the truth-value of the belief that water* 
always contains oxygen depends on facts about the world beyond Oscar and 
Toscar. This respects the intuition that truth is a paradigmatic broad semantic 
property. But nonetheless, Segal’s view implies that beliefs of duplicate 
subjects will never differ in truth-value. BROADT is, on this internalist 
understanding of the content of non-indexical beliefs, false.6 
Now consider the example in Burge (1979) of Alf and counterfactual 
Alf, each of whom utters the same-sounding sentence ‘Arthritis can spread to 
the thigh’. In Alf’s community the term ‘arthritis’ is defined as an ailment 
                                                 
6 Farkas (2013: 174) suggests that utterances of sentences containing the term ‘water’ 
might express the same content on Earth and Twin Earth despite a difference in truth-
conditions. This would constitute an extension of her account of indexical beliefs 
mentioned above. However, she does not endorse the view and does not specify what the 
content of such beliefs would be. As such, I merely note that this provides a potential 
internalist alternative to Segal’s view of non-indexical beliefs. 
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specifically confined to the joints, whereas in counterfactual Alf’s 
community, the term ‘arthritis’ has a broader definition and applies in 
addition to similar ailments outside the joints. According to the externalist, 
Alf expresses the belief that arthritis can spread to the thigh, a belief which is 
false, while counterfactual Alf expresses the distinct belief that tharthritis can 
spread to the thigh, a belief which is true. The intuition depends on 
individuating the content of a belief by appeal to the broad property of its 
being embedded in a particular socio-linguistic community, and once again 
it illustrates the truth of BROADT on the externalist understanding of the 
content of non-indexical beliefs. But Segal rejects this interpretation. His 
commitment to NARROWc leads him to attribute Alf and counterfactual Alf 
beliefs with the same content on the grounds that the beliefs have the same 
(narrow) cognitive role. According to Segal, both Alf and counterfactual Alf 
believe that tharthritis can spread to the thigh, and both beliefs are true. More 
generally, the truth-value of corresponding non-indexical beliefs of duplicate 
subjects will, on Segal’s internalist theory, necessarily have the same truth-
value. This is because corresponding non-indexical beliefs of duplicate 
subjects have the same content, and the content, being a complete 
proposition, has its truth-conditions essentially. BROADT is false.
  
In conclusion, while the set {TRANSPARENCY, BROADT, 
NARROWc} is indeed inconsistent, there is a natural internalist 
understanding of indexical beliefs according to which they satisfy BROADT 
but not TRANSPARENCY, and a natural internalist understanding of non-
indexical beliefs according to which they satisfy TRANSPARENCY but not 
BROADT. On neither view need we give up NARROWc. Whether we choose 
to accept such internalist positions, or whether we choose instead to embrace 
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externalism, will, I maintain, be determined by independent factors such as 
intuition, thought experiment and perceived explanatory gain. What is clear 
is that we do not yet have a proof of externalism.7 
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